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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In states with a distinct culture of property ownership in groundwater, 
like California and Texas, finding an approach to sustainable basin 
management has been difficult.  Although there have been successes, both 
states continue to struggle with the looming threat of dwindling groundwater 
supplies and the associated impacts.  Some basins are on a path to complete 
destruction as a result of groundwater mining; in others, intense and 
sometimes devastating consequences result from continuous overpumping.1 
Although the rules governing groundwater rights in California and 
Texas are different, one commonality is that, because groundwater rights 
attach to ownership of real property, both states must sometimes confront the 
issue of dormant rights, i.e., rights not yet exercised but for which there is a 
perpetual expectation of increased pumping.2  Courts and property owners 
have been reluctant to support attempts to quantify such rights and indeed 
have maintained that such quantification is precluded by the fact that dormant 
rights are uniquely associated with water rights that derive from ownership 
of real property.3  Yet scientists and policy experts increasingly recognize 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Alexandra S. Richey et al., Quantifying Renewable Groundwater Stress with GRACE, 51 WATER 
RESOURCES RES. 5217, 5225–26 (2015), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2015WR017349/ 
full (identifying California’s Central Valley as one of the world’s most impacted basins); Samantha Fox, 
Groundwater Depletion: Is Texas Draining Its Savings Account?, WATER SAGE, http://www.watersage. 
com/blog/list-blog/october-2015/groundwater-depletion-is-texas-draining-its-saving/ (last visited Apr. 4, 
2016). 
 2. See Dormant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (stating that “dormant” means 
inactive or latent, as in existing but unexercised).  In water law, these rights are sometimes also called 
“prospective” or “inchoate,” meaning undeveloped. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 
1 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J., concurring) (stating that the common law rule of capture “entitles 
a landowner to withdraw an unlimited amount of groundwater”); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 
S.W.3d 118, 152–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (holding that the property owner was 
entitled to unlimited pumping from the Edwards Aquifer); cf. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. 
Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 990 (Cal. 1935) (holding that dormant rights could not be defined); Wells A. Hutchins 
& Harry A. Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines and Their Implications for River Basin Management, 
22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 276, 289 (1957) (“A major difficulty . . . is the matter of unused riparian 
rights. . . .  [T]he water right is neither gained by use nor lost by disuse, future use stands as high as present 
use. . . .  This right reaches into the indefinite future; there is no time limitation whatsoever.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 152–53 (holding that the property owner was entitled to 
unlimited pumping from the Edwards Aquifer); Erica Gies, Battle Wages for California Groundwater 
Rights, CLIMATE CENT. (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/battle-for-california-
groundwater-rights-17956 (describing a property owner’s characterization of groundwater rights as 
inviolable against government regulation). 
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that quantification of these rights is necessary to ensure the continued 
viability of heavily pumped groundwater basins.4  Dormant claims to a scarce 
supply also create economic uncertainty and risk for all pumpers, including 
the landowner who holds those dormant rights.5  Despite this, quantification 
is perceived as antithetical to water rights based in property ownership, and 
efforts to quantify future rights are routinely met with hostility and claims of 
government overreach.6 
This issue is ripe for discussion in California and Texas.  The California 
Supreme Court has concluded that, in the surface water context, 
quantification is authorized by the reasonable use doctrine, but California 
courts have previously rejected attempts to quantify dormant rights to 
groundwater.7  A statute adopted in October 2015 places the issue of 
quantification squarely before California courts.8  In Texas, the issue of as-yet 
unexercised property rights in groundwater is also simmering, following the 
2012 and 2013 declarations of the Texas judiciary that groundwater is owned 
“in place,” without the necessity of capture, and that such property-based 
rights are considered unlimited prior to state regulation.9 
This Article argues that the idea that a land-based right cannot be 
quantified is legally incorrect and that the idea of an unlimited right is 
illusory.10  This Article further argues that quantification of land-based rights 
to groundwater is consistent with the fundamental nature of these rights, 
rather than antithetical, due to the physicality of the owned property as a 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See generally BRIAN GRAY ET AL., PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL., ALLOCATING CALIFORNIA’S WATER: 
DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM (Nov. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1115BGR.pdf. 
 5. See Gabe Collins, Blue Gold: Commoditize Groundwater and Use Correlative Management to 
Balance City, Farm, and Frac Water Use in Texas, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 441, 442 (2015) (“Texans 
should also ask, ‘What good is a right to extract a resource from common pools if every other property 
owner with access to the pool also enjoys an “absolute” right to extraction and use?’”); C.-Y. Cynthia Lin 
Lawell, Property Rights and Groundwater Management in the High Plains Aquifer 28 (Oct. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/Lin/water_temporal_property_rts_paper. 
pdf (“If producers are concerned with future profits, they will treat the groundwater as a nonrenewable 
resource.”); cf. Justin Gillis & Matt Richtel, Beneath California Crops, Groundwater Crisis Grows, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/science/beneath-california-crops-
groundwater-crisis-grows.html?_r=0 (“You see the lack of regulation hurting the agricultural community 
as much as it hurts anybody else.” (quoting Doug Obegi, a lawyer with the Natural Resources Defense 
Council)). 
 6. See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 753–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting an 
attempt to quantify dormant rights); Mark Meckler, California Laws Restrict Groundwater Use on Private 
Land, BREITBART (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/california/2014/09/18/ca-laws-restrict-
groundwater-use-on-private-land/. 
 7. Tulare Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d at 990; Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. at 753–54. 
 8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 2016). 
 9. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 828–29 (Tex. 2012); Edwards Aquifer Auth. 
v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 152–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). 
 10. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2014) 
(“A property entitlement to pump an unlimited amount of water, secured against government 
regulation . . . is unsustainable and is illusory . . . .”); Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in 
the Age of Permanent Depletion, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1263, 1309 (2014) (distinguishing between the 
available property right as defined by hydrology and the perceived legal status of groundwater). 
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depletable common pool resource.11  Limits are an inherent element of the 
property right itself, and thus quantification should be part of a property 
owner’s expectations.12  Moreover, although protests to quantification are 
typically based on the rhetoric of protecting individual rights to groundwater, 
recognition of these inherent limits increases predictability and certainty, and 
thus tends to enhance the value of property rights in 
groundwater.13  Ultimately, this Article demonstrates that waste and 
destruction of a common pool resource are not part of the land-based right, 
and that the exercise of that right may be regulated and quantified to avoid 
these outcomes. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Ownership of Real Property Is Special 
Among all of the rights to property, ownership of land is special.  Like 
Scarlett O’Hara and her “red earth of Tara,” people have a strong 
psychological connection to land.14  Emotional ties to water rights connected 
to property appear to be just as deep, and anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the connection may be even stronger for groundwater than for surface 
water.15  One can imagine several reasons for this.  First, there is the physical 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 12. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Rise and the Demise of the Absolute Dominion Doctrine for 
Groundwater, 35 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 291, 312 (2013) (referencing “the general limitation on 
all use of property [including water rights under absolute ownership] embedded in the law of nuisance” 
(quoting State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 343–48 (Wis. 1974))); Dave Owen, 
Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 294 n.247 (2013) (describing a natural law theory under 
which a property right in groundwater is elevated above both its economic value and political control, and 
ultimately rejecting the theory as rhetorically powerful but with an uncertain doctrinal foundation). 
 13. See TEX. WATER DEV. BD., REPORT 361: 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO 
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 14 (William F. Mullican, III & Suzanne Schwartz eds., 2004), 
https://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/numbered-reports/doc/R361/R361.pdf (“Quantification 
of groundwater rights is helpful, if not essential, to effective marketing of groundwater.”); Ronald Kaiser 
& Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in 
Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249, 258 (2001) (describing the economic consequences of pumping without 
regard to aquifer limits); Lawell, supra note 5. 
 14. See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property 
Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713, 714–
16 (2008) (noting that “subjective value” associated with private property is often higher than market 
value due to psychological ties to property); cf. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, “To Be Human”: A Psychological 
Perspective on Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609, 638–39 (2009) (“[P]hysical property may affect the 
legal system through its own influence on human psychology.”).  Scarlett O’Hara is the heroine of the 
Pulitzer Prize winning novel Gone with the Wind by Margaret Mitchell (published 1937) and the 1939 
blockbuster film of the same name produced by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.  Tara is the name of the O’Hara 
family plantation, and there are numerous references throughout the book and film to Scarlett’s emotional 
connection to the property and its “red earth.” 
 15. See, e.g., Lisa M. Krieger, In California, Farmers and Senior Water Rights Under Siege, REC. 
SEARCHLIGHT (June 5, 2015), http://www.redding.com/news/in-california-farmers-and-senior-water-
rights-under-siege-ep-1121832616-353450291.html (describing farmers’ strong ties to water rights); 
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fact that surface water can be seen moving off the property, but groundwater 
lies hidden, perceived as a personal storage tank, a seemingly perpetual 
resource.16  Second, groundwater resources have a strong connection to 
farming, ranching, and other agricultural activities that deepen the connection 
between property owners and land.17  Although some might argue that the 
rhetoric is less personal and more economically motivated, there is no 
question that some farmers have a strong, family-connected, legacy-focused 
emotional tie to their property rights, including their water rights.18  And in 
fact, whatever the motivation, governments in California and Texas have 
tended to exercise much earlier and stronger regulatory authority over surface 
water systems as compared to groundwater.19  Groundwater regulation 
continues to be spotty or nonexistent in key areas, particularly agricultural 
areas, and is heavily dominated by property-rights rhetoric. 
B.  Groundwater as a Common Pool Resource 
Groundwater is one of the most recognizable examples of a common 
pool resource, consisting of a core resource and limited extractable “fringe 
units.”20  The fringe units can be consumed but the core resource must be 
                                                                                                                 
Mark Lubell, Water Psychology: Please Lie Down on My Couch, CTR. FOR ENVTL. POL’Y & BEHAV. 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://environmentalpolicy.ucdavis.edu/node/341 (describing emotional connections to 
drinking water); Conflict in Klamath, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 29, 2001), https://www.splcenter.org/ 
fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2001/conflict-klamath (detailing protestors who used chain saws and 
blow torches to open gates and release irrigation water held back by the federal government, and siphoned 
water around head gates and into farm canals until federal marshals were called); cf. Paul Conable, Equal 
Footing, County Supremacy, and the Western Public Lands, 26 ENVTL. L. 1263, 1264–65 (1996) 
(describing conflict between local and federal governments over western land, as during the Sagebrush 
Rebellion); Nancy Langston, Opinion, In Oregon, Myth Mixes with Anger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/opinion/in-oregon-myth-mixes-with-anger.html?r=0 (describing 
the anger of rural property owners regarding federal regulation and ownership of land in the West); Tay 
Wiles, Malheur Occupation, Explained, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.hcn.org/ 
articles/oregon-occupation-at-wildlife-refuge (noting the connection between the recent armed occupation 
of federal land in Oregon and anger about perceived invasion of rights to land). 
 16. See Amy Hardberger, World’s Worst Game of Telephone: Attempting to Understand the 
Conversation Between Texas’s Legislature and Courts on Groundwater, 43 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 257, 267 
(2013). 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 262 (noting that in 2008, 80% of Texas groundwater was pumped for irrigation 
purposes); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903) (describing the importance of groundwater to 
agriculture). 
 18. See Krieger, supra note 15. 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 109, 125 (1990); see also Christopher R. Brown & Blake Farrar, A Hole in the 
Bucket: Aspermont’s Impact on Groundwater Districts and What It Says About Texas Groundwater 
Policy, 39 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5, 34 (2008) (citing Donald H. Negri, The Common Property Aquifer as a 
Differential Game, 25 WATER RESOURCES RES. 9, 9-15 (1989)) (analyzing groundwater as a common 
pool resource); Alan E. Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible 
Resources, 18 UCLA L. REV. 855, 855 (1971) (describing groundwater as a classic common pool 
resource). 
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protected to allow for continued consumption.21  An individual’s use of a 
common pool resource extracts benefits that then become unavailable to 
others.22  For purposes of this Article, “sustainability” is defined as protection 
of this core resource for continued consumption, as opposed to depletion the 
resource entirely.23 
The common pool resource of groundwater is not necessarily, or even 
typically, equated with a legal system of common property or community 
ownership.24  A common pool resource may be governed by a range of legal 
and institutional structures, including private property law, government 
regulation, community-based rules and norms, or some combination of 
these.25  A common pool resource is also not necessarily the same as the 
“commons,” defined as open-access natural resources used by individuals in 
the absence of government regulation, although specific groundwater 
systems may approximate commons.26 
For natural resources such as groundwater, the common pool may be 
renewable or depletable.27  Depletable (alternatively, exhaustible) means that 
the resource is nonrenewable so that use will eventually lead to destruction 
of the resource.28  Nonrenewable resources are characterized by limited 
supply, typically because replenishment only occurs over the long-term; 
                                                                                                                 
 21. OSTROM, supra note 20. 
 22. Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of Common-Pool Resources, ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2008), http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/July-
August%202008/ostrom-full.html. 
 23. This Article focuses on minimal levels to sustain the resource itself and does not address the 
broader meaning of sustainability, under which decision-makers are concerned with varying degrees of 
economic, environmental, and equitable values for present and future generations. See, e.g., Dan Tarlock, 
Do Water Law and Policy Promote Sustainable Water Use?, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 642, 644 (2011).  
These broader considerations are critical for quantification determinations but irrelevant to the question 
whether a land-based right fundamentally precludes quantification. 
 24. Ostrom, supra note 22. 
 25. Id.  Even in mixed systems involving some government or public ownership interests, 
groundwater is often connected to the rhetoric of individual rights. Nicholas Brozović, David L. Sunding 
& David Zilberman, Optimal Management of Groundwater over Space and Time, in FRONTIERS IN 
WATER RESOURCE ECONOMY 2 (2006), http://are.berkeley.edu/~sunding/ brozovic_groundwater.pdf. 
 26. Lee Anne Fennell, Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons, 5 INT’L J. COMMONS 9, 12 
(2011). 
 27. Friedman, supra note 20 (describing groundwater as an exhaustible resource); Tom Gleeson et 
al., The Global Volume and Distribution of Modern Groundwater, 9 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 161 (2015) 
(concluding that most groundwater is nonrenewable because less than ten percent of groundwater is 
replenished and renewed within a “human lifetime” of fifty years). 
 28. See, e.g., James Sweeney, Economic Theory of Depletable Resources: An Introduction, in 
3 HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCE & ENERGY ECONOMY 752 (1993). 
Based on the time scale of the relevant adjustment processes, we can also classify resources as 
expendable, renewable, or depletable.  Depletable resources are those whose adjustment speed 
is so slow that we can meaningfully model them as made available once and only once by 
nature.  Crude oil or natural gas deposits provide prototypical examples, but a virgin 
wilderness, an endangered species, or top soil also can well be viewed as depletable resources.  
Renewable resources adjust more rapidly so that they are self renewing within a time scale 
important for economic decisionmaking. 
Id. 
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short-term heavy use will result in “mining” the resource until nothing is 
left.29  Coal and natural gas are examples of depletable resources.30  
Renewable resources, in contrast, replenish naturally and over relatively 
short periods of time.31 
Groundwater that recharges naturally is, in one sense, a renewable 
resource.32  However, groundwater recharge is highly variable depending on 
geography.33  In many instances the natural recharge is so slow that the 
resource is essentially depletable from a human perspective, at least absent 
artificial recharge.34  Due to a lack of effective regulation, groundwater in 
many basins is being pumped at rates much higher than natural recharge.35  
In these basins, the groundwater resource is at risk of being left practically or 
physically unusable; other basins may reach this state without adequate 
controls.36  Because it is these basins and their physical vulnerability with 
which this Article is concerned, this Article refers to groundwater as a 
depletable resource, with the caveat that individual basins may be arguably 
renewable and other basins are potentially renewable given appropriate 
management and favorable hydrologic conditions (i.e., lots of rain and snow). 
C.  What Are Land-Based Rights and What’s So Special About Them? 
Although water allocation rules vary significantly between states, as a 
general matter, water rights can be divided into two general categories: 
(1) rights acquired and exercised by virtue of ownership of real property 
(land-based rights) and (2) rights that depend on application of water to 
beneficial use (use-based rights).37  Some states recognize only land-based 
rights, some states recognize only use-based rights, and some have created 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id.; Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13 (describing groundwater mining). 
 30. Sweeney, supra note 28. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See generally BRIDGET R. SCANLON ET AL., GROUNDWATER RECHARGE IN TEXAS (2000), 
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/environqlty/vadose/pdfs/webbio_pdfs/TWDBRechRept.pdf. 
 34. E.g., Amy Hardberger, What Lies Beneath: Determining the Necessity of International 
Groundwater Policy Along the United States–Mexico Border and a Roadmap to an Agreement, 35 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1211, 1214 (2004) (citing DAVID KEITH TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 13, 15–16 
(2d ed. 1980)) (describing geological variation in groundwater renewability); Review of World Water 
Resources by Country, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED NATIONS, (2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005 
/y4473e/y4473e06.htm  (describing how water resources can be renewable or nonrenewable depending 
on management); see also Jane Braxton Little, The Ogallala Aquifer: Saving a Vital U.S. Water Source, 
SCI. AM. (Mar. 1, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-ogallala-aquifer/ (noting that 
scientific consensus is that the Ogallala Aquifer would take approximately 6,000 years to recharge 
naturally). 
 35. See Little, supra note 34. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 282–88. 
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new versions of each kind of right that incorporates elements of the other.38  
A few so-called hybrid states like California recognize both types of rights.39 
A land-based right is an ownership interest in real property that either 
(1) is adjacent to surface water, such as a river; or (2) sits on top of a 
groundwater basin and may include the right to divert or pump such water.40  
This type of right is considered “part and parcel of the land,” i.e., the water 
right inheres in the soil itself and is more than some other type of property 
right like an easement or other appurtenance.41 
Land-based rights may be called by different titles depending on the 
source of the water.  When the source of water is surface water such as a 
river, creek, stream, or lake, these rights are referred to as “riparian.”42  The 
word riparian has its roots in the Latin term ripa, which means bank; i.e., 
these rights exist when property includes the banks of rivers.43 
Land-based rights also extend to groundwater located beneath the 
surface of the property.44  When the source is groundwater, land-based rights 
do not have a consistent nomenclature.  In states where there are no 
contrasting use-based rights, land-based rights are simply referred to as 
groundwater rights or pumping rights.45  In California, land-based rights to 
groundwater are called “overlying” rights, referencing the fact that the rights 
exist where property overlies, or sits on top of, a groundwater basin.46 
In contrast to land-based rights, use-based rights are created when water 
is applied to a beneficial use.47  Beneficial uses vary by state and over time, 
but the idea generally refers to an activity that has social value, such as 
drinking water and other household needs, industry, agriculture, recreation, 
hydropower, fish, wildlife, and ecosystems.48  Under the common law, the 
physical act of applying water to beneficial use was sufficient to establish the 
right.49  With regard to surface water, in most states, an application must 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See id. at 288, 299. 
 39. See id. at 284. 
 40. See id. at 282–84. 
 41. See id. at 282. 
 42. Id. at 282–83.  Sometimes, in the case of lakes, the term used is littoral. See 78 AM. JUR. 2D 
Waters § 33 (2013) (defining “littoral rights” as rights that inhere in property contiguous to a lake or sea). 
 43. E.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA. 
L. REV. 539, 555 n.75 (2004) (citing Johnson v. McCowen, 348 So. 2d 357, 360 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1977)). 
 44. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903); Houst. & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 
280–81 (Tex. 1904); Acton v. Blundell [1843], 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (noting “that the person who 
owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and 
pleasure”). 
 45. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 282–83. 
 46. See id. 
 47. E.g., Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for 
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 920 (1998) (“Beneficial use, without waste, is the 
basis, measure, and limit of a water right.”). 
 48. Id. at 926–28. 
 49. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 282. 
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typically be filed before water can be used; the grant of an application confers 
an inchoate right that is developed (or “perfected”) by diligence in physically 
diverting the water and putting it to beneficial use.50  Some state permitting 
systems, like California’s, recognize the continued validity of common law 
rights to surface water that pre-date the permit requirement, and therefore, 
both common law and permit-based rights exist side-by-side.51 
In the groundwater context, the concept of use-based rights is more 
complex.  In some states, landowners may pump groundwater from overlying 
land and use it away from the overlying land without affecting the nature of 
the water right.52  In other states, the use of water off-tract changes the nature 
of the right, transforming a land-based right into a use-based right.53  Other 
states have adopted a use-based system for all groundwater pumping.54 
In their classic common-law forms, land-based rights and use-based 
rights are governed by fundamentally different principles.  These differences 
illustrate the unique nature of land-based rights and why they are considered 
special and valuable.55  The following four sections describe the most 
fundamental differences of the common-law principles. 
1.  Perpetual 
Unlike a use-based right, a right based in property ownership is not 
forfeited for non-use.56  A property owner with otherwise intact land-based 
rights to water can choose to keep her acreage undeveloped for 100 years but 
may initiate pumping at any time.  From this perspective, such rights exist in 
perpetuity; the rights do not depend on use for their existence or continuing 
validity.57  In contrast, for use-based rights, beneficial use is the “basis, 
measure, and limit,” and failure to actually apply water to some socially 
acceptable purpose means that either the right never existed (failure to 
perfect) or that it has been lost (forfeited).58 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 283. 
 51. CAL. WATER CODE § 1202 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of    
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.) (excluding vested common-law appropriative rights from the permitting system). 
 52. See Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13, at 261–68 (surveying U.S. groundwater rights systems). 
 53. See id.; see also WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 455–58 (1956) 
(discussing use-based rights to groundwater in California).  
 54. See Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13, at 268. 
 55. Land-based rights also have limits.  Classic riparian rights, for example, are generally limited to 
use on parcels contiguous to the surface watercourse, wherein the parcel’s legal boundaries also serve as 
riparian boundaries, and to that portion of the contiguous parcel that is within the watershed of the relevant 
watercourse.  Land-based rights to groundwater are sometimes similarly limited, with the boundaries for 
use drawn around that portion of the parcel that overlies the groundwater basin. 
 56. Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 921–24 (Cal. 1884).  A land-based right may be deliberately 
extinguished by deed or contract. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 287–90. 
 57. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 291. 
 58. Id. at 286–87 (describing forfeiture); see Millview Cty. Water Dist. v. State Water Res. Control 
Bd., 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 735, 749–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (describing the rules requiring perfection of 
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2.  Shortage Allocation 
Another core feature of water rights centers around allocation of water 
during times of shortage.  Riparian rights are typically correlative, i.e., 
compared to each other they have equal priority.59  Under correlative 
principles, riparian right holders may each take a proportional share of the 
available supply, provided the water is used reasonably; during a shortage, 
riparian right holders must “share the pain” of drought.60 
In California, the formal rule for shortage allocation of overlying rights 
is correlative as between each other, and priority as against appropriators, but 
appropriators can gain priority via prescriptive rights if they are pumping and 
overlying users are not.61  In Texas, unless a special district has jurisdiction, 
the law of the biggest pump controls shortage allocation.62  The remainder of 
the United States is divided among five general groundwater doctrines.63 
The experience of shortage is different in the groundwater versus 
surface water context because groundwater basins are, in essence, storage 
reservoirs.64  This means that groundwater basins can provide a valuable 
water supply when surface water is in short supply.65  A groundwater basin 
in constant decline during a series of wet and dry years is said to be in a state 
of overdraft, which occurs when pumping exceeds recharge on a long-term 
basis and the basin experiences adverse effects such as subsidence and 
decreased water quality.66 
Whether surface water or groundwater, rights based on beneficial use 
typically operate according to the principle of priority, under which the first 
water user to start the process of putting water to beneficial use is the “senior” 
and may take as much water as needed before the next water user in time (the 
                                                                                                                 
appropriative rights and forfeiture); Neuman, supra note 47, at 926–38 (describing the doctrine of 
beneficial use). 
 59. See Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Ark. 1955); Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 
72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 284. 
 60. Prather v. Hoberg, 150 P.2d 405, 411–12 (Cal. 1944); Pleasant Valley Canal Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 24. 
 61. E.g., City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 501–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 62. Dylan O. Drummond et al., The Rule of Capture in Texas—Still So Misunderstood After All 
These Years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 53 (2004) (referencing Texas’s “law of the biggest pump”). 
 63. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 277–78; see Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on 
Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 269–310 (2013) (describing the five doctrines and the 
principles followed in each state). 
 64. See Drought & Groundwater, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://ca.water.usgs. 
gov/data/drought/groundwater.html. 
 65. E.g., Drought Impacts, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Mar. 24, 2016), http://ca.water.usgs.gov/ 
data/drought/drought-impact.html (“Unlike the effects of a drought on streamflows, groundwater levels 
in wells may not reflect a shortage of rainfall for a year or more after a drought begins.  Despite reduced 
availability, reliance upon groundwater often increases during drought through increased groundwater 
pumping to meet water demands.”). 
 66. E.g., CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER: BULLETIN 118 96 (2003), 
http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_118/california’s_groundwater__bulletin_118_-_ 
update_2003_/bulletin118_entire.pdf. 
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“junior”) may take any.67  In its classic form, this priority system contrasts 
sharply with the land-based correlative duty to share the pain of shortages.68  
In hybrid systems that recognize both land-based and use-based rights, such 
as California, land-based rights as a class may have priority over use-based 
rights.69  For example, with respect to surface water, in California, riparian 
and overlying right holders are typically senior to appropriators.70 
3.  Quantity 
Land-based rights are not fixed in quantity.71  In Texas, the right holder 
may divert or pump as much as she can use without waste; in California, the 
right holder may divert or pump as much as can be reasonably used on the 
property to which the right is attached.72  Appropriative rights, in contrast, 
are tied to a specific quantity of water.73 
4.  Dormant Priority 
In California, a dormant land-based right to groundwater retains priority 
over other land-based rights and actively pumping appropriators, meaning 
that when the land-based right is exercised, it displaces existing uses.74  Even 
in Texas, where there are no appropriative rights to groundwater, the exercise 
of dormant land-based rights is disruptive because new uses do not have to 
respect or give way to existing uses.75 
The combination of the above special attributes of land-based rights 
renders the exercise, or even the potential exercise, of dormant rights hugely 
disruptive to existing users.76  Where dormant rights remain unquantified, 
                                                                                                                 
 67. HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 132. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 62–63. 
 70. Id. at 62–63, 441–42 (discussing surface water and groundwater). 
 71. E.g., Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 284. 
 72. E.g., id.; Texas Water Law, TEX. A&M UNIV.: TEX. WATER, http://texaswater.tamu.edu/ 
water-law (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (describing five exceptions to the rule of capture). 
 73. E.g., Pleasant Valley Canal Co. v. Borror, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 23–24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); 
Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 284–85. 
 74. See Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 666 
n.10 (Cal. 1979) (“As against an appropriator, a riparian owner is accorded a fixed priority of right.  But 
the quantity of water to which the right attaches remains unfixed.  Thus, an expanded riparian use has the 
potential to preempt an inferior appropriative right where the supply [of] water originally was sufficient 
to satisfy both uses.” (quoting WATER REVIEW COMM’N, GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW 
CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 21 (1978))); Meridian, Ltd. v. City of San Francisco, 
90 P.2d 537, 548 (Cal. 1939); Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 986 (Cal. 
1935); Pleasant Valley Canal Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28 (“[U]ntil the riparian needs the water, the 
appropriator may use it, thus, at all times, putting all of the available water to beneficial uses.”); see also 
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (discussing why water must be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent possible). 
 75. See infra Part II.D. 
 76. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 40 P.2d 486, 494–95 (Cal. 1935); Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, 
at 289–90. 
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basin management is uncertain, and existing users cannot plan or gauge 
risk.77  Where unquantified and unplanned-for dormant rights are exercised, 
such pumping can substantially upset existing investments.78 
D.  Land-Based Rights to Groundwater in Texas 
In Texas, groundwater is a private property right governed by the 
doctrine of “absolute ownership” and the rule of capture.79  The doctrine of 
absolute ownership as applied to water is generally attributed to the decision 
of an English court in the 1843 case of Acton v. Blundell.80  In that case, the 
defendants were miners who sank pits on their land and drained groundwater 
away from their neighbor’s property.81  The court held that because the 
defendants owned the land, they also had a property interest in the 
underground water.82  The court held further that the defendants could not be 
held liable for damage to the neighboring well because the ways of 
groundwater were mysterious and unpredictable, and therefore, any rule 
imposing liability would interfere with resource development.83  This 
principle of no liability is referred to as the “rule of capture.”84 
Texas adopted the rule of capture and the absolute ownership rule in 
1904, citing the same reasons given in Acton v. Blundell.85  Because the rule 
of capture provides that a landowner has a right to pump as much 
groundwater as she can, regardless of injury to neighboring landowners, 
damnum absque injuriâ, Texas water law is sometimes called the “law of the 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771–72 (Cal. 1903).  Adopting the doctrine of reasonable use, 
the court first recognized that “[n]o doubt there will be inconvenience from attacks on the title to waters 
appropriated for use on distant lands made by persons who claim the right to the reasonable use of such 
waters on their own [overlying] lands.” Id.  Second, the court acknowledged that “[s]imilar difficulties 
have arisen . . . in surface streams, and must always be expected to attend claims to rights in a substance 
so movable as water.” Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. E.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 828–29 (Tex. 2012) (absolute ownership); 
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999) (rule of capture); CHARLES R. 
PORTER, SHARING THE COMMON POOL: WATER RIGHTS IN THE EVERYDAY LIVES OF TEXANS 40–41 
(2014) (discussing absolute ownership and the rule of capture); see Drummond et al., supra note 62, at 
51. 
 80. Acton v. Blundell [1843], 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1223; cf. Jno B. Clayberg, The Law of 
Percolating Waters, 14 MICH. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (1915) (noting that some argue that the rule of absolute 
ownership for groundwater was decided first in Chasemore v. Richards, (1915) 7 HL 349 (Eng.)); 
Dellapenna, supra note 12, at 295 (arguing that the 1836 Massachusetts case of Greenleaf v. Francis was 
“[t]he first reported common-law case in which the court addressed the problem in terms recognizable as 
the absolute dominion doctrine”). 
 81. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1223–24. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1228. 
 84. Drummond et al., supra note 62, at 53–54 (describing the liability rules associated with the rule 
of capture). 
 85. Houst. & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280–81 (Tex. 1904). 
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biggest pump.”86  Texas law establishes various exceptions to the principle 
of no liability under the rule of capture: trespass, malicious conduct, waste, 
contamination, and causing land subsidence through negligent 
over-pumping.87 
For many years it was unclear whether Texas landowners held a 
compensable property interest in groundwater prior to pumping, or whether 
the property right in water attached only when the water was brought to the 
surface.88  The Texas Supreme Court finally clarified the issue in 2012 in 
Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day.89  The Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) 
is a political subdivision of Texas charged with managing the groundwater 
resources of the Edwards Aquifer.90  Property owners within the EAA’s 
jurisdiction applied for a permit to withdraw 700 acre-feet of water per year 
for irrigation purposes.91  EAA denied the application, but on administrative 
appeal, the property owners were awarded 14 acre-feet per year.92  The 
property owners sued EAA for taking their property without just 
compensation, as required by both federal and Texas law.93  One issue raised 
in the suit was whether the property owners could claim a compensable right 
to underground water available to the owners, but not yet pumped by them.94  
The Texas Supreme Court took up the case and held that Texas landowners 
may assert a right to “groundwater in place,” i.e., groundwater as it sits in the 
aquifer prior to pumping.95  In so doing, the Day court confirmed that 
property owners in Texas possess an inchoate, unquantified right to future 
groundwater supplies—essentially, a dormant, land-based right.96 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 76 (Tex. 1999) (“The rule of capture 
essentially allows, with some limited exceptions, a landowner to pump as much groundwater as the 
landowner chooses, without liability to neighbors who claim that the pumping has depleted their wells.”); 
Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235 (describing the rule of capture as a rule allowing the surface owner to “dig 
therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure,” and explaining 
the consequences of exercising that right fully, such that the owner “intercepts or drains off the water 
collected from underground springs in his neighbour’s well, this inconvenience to his neighbour falls 
within the description of damnum absque injuriâ [(an injury without a remedy)], which cannot become 
the ground of an action”); Drummond et al., supra note 62 (citing terms of the law of capture, including 
the “law of the biggest pump”). 
 87. E.g., KATHY WYTHE, TEX. WATER RES. INST., TXH20 28 (2014), http://twri.tamu.edu/media/ 
574130/web_txh2o_summer2014.pdf (Q&A with Professor Tiffany Dowell); Texas Water Law, supra 
note 72 (describing five exceptions to the rule of capture). 
 88. See, e.g., Marvin W. Jones & Andrew Little, The Ownership of Groundwater in Texas: A 
Contrived Battle for State Control of Groundwater, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 578, 578–79 (2009). 
 89. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 814 (Tex. 2012). 
 90. Id. at 818. 
 91. Id. at 820. 
 92. Id. at 821. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 821–22. 
 95. Id. at 817, 832–33. 
 96. Unlike California, the Texas water right system does not recognize a separate category of use-
based rights to groundwater. See id.; HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 132.  In other words, Texas property 
owners can use groundwater away from the overlying land.  In some areas, use may be constrained by the 
rules of groundwater conservation districts, which were created in 1985 and today possess broad authority 
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E.  Land-Based Rights to Groundwater in California 
California also recognizes a land-based interest in groundwater for 
property owners that overlie a groundwater basin, but relative to Texas, 
California adopted very different rules to govern that interest.97  In the 1903 
case of Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California Supreme Court rejected the rule 
of absolute ownership in favor of the correlative rights doctrine and the rule 
of reasonable use.98  Under the doctrine of correlative rights, no overlying 
property owner has priority over other overlying owners.99  The rule of 
reasonable use, in turn, provides that property owners may pump 
groundwater despite injury to neighbors, as long as the use is reasonable 
relative to the injured use and other potential uses of the water.100  
Unreasonable use resulting in injury may be enjoined.101 
California also recognizes rights in overlying owners to convey 
groundwater to non-overlying owners, and in non-overlying owners to pump 
from groundwater basins to which they have lawful access.102  However, any 
water used upon non-overlying lands is characterized as a use-based, 
appropriative right rather than a land-based right.103  Appropriative rights 
attach only to surplus water, and ab initio do not include the right to pump 
during periods of non-surplus.104  If appropriators pump for five years or 
more during overdraft, they may gain priority over unexercised overlying 
rights because those active appropriators are said to be invading the rights of 
overlying owners.105  This pumping of nonsurplus water may ripen into a 
prescriptive right, thereby enabling appropriators to continue pumping during 
overdraft.106  However, such prescriptive rights can be denied or limited via 
continued pumping by overlying owners during overdraft or in periods of no 
surplus, a practice referred to as self-help.107 
                                                                                                                 
to regulate groundwater use. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.001–.124 (West 2008 & Supp. 2015).  
These districts may issue rules for conserving, protecting, recharging, and preventing waste of 
underground water. See id. 
 97. E.g., City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 860 (Cal. 2000). 
 98. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903).  The rule of reasonable use adopted by Katz is 
distinct from the groundwater doctrine called “reasonable use” in other states, which itself does not adhere 
to reasonable use. 
 99. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 502–04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Wells A. 
Hutchins, California Ground Water: Legal Problems, 45 CAL. L. REV. 688, 689 (1957) (“No overlying 
owner has priority over any others solely because he used the water first.”). 
 100. Katz, 74 P. at 771–72. 
 101. Id. 
 102. City of Santa Maria, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501; Hutchins, supra note 99, at 690.  
 103. Hutchins, supra note 99, at 690.  In addition, use of overlying groundwater for municipal 
purposes is deemed appropriative rather than land-based. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 
P. 784, 791–92 (Cal. 1921). 
 104. City of Santa Maria, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 502. 
 105. Id. at 511–12. 
 106. Id. at 511–13. 
 107. Id. at 517. 
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As a result of the rules developed for overlying (land-based) and 
appropriative (use-based) property owners, the general legal scheme for 
priority rules in California are as follows: first, overlying rights have equal 
priority; second, overlying rights are senior to all appropriative rights; and 
third, as between appropriators, the rule of priority applies.  The priority of 
overlying dormant rights exists as a result of the second rule, plus the fact 
that overlying owners do not lose the right to pump water for lack of use.  
This means that an overlying owner can initiate new pumping at any time, 
even if there is injury to appropriators.108  To take an extreme example, an 
appropriator might have been pumping for 100 years, and if a neighboring 
property owner overlying the basin decides to plant orchards on the overlying 
land, the overlying owner can displace the appropriator even, theoretically, 
to the point of taking all of the underground supply from the appropriator. 
This formalistic outcome is often modified in practice by the ability of 
appropriative rights holders to gain prescriptive rights over dormant 
overlying rights, and these prescriptive rights may be quantified during 
adjudication.109  Yet prescriptive rights and adjudication do not entirely 
resolve the issue of dormant rights to groundwater for several reasons.  First, 
with luck, California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 2014 
(SGMA) will lead to quantitative, data-driven management at the local level 
without the need for adjudication.110  Such management efforts will require 
addressing dormant rights.111  Second, even in adjudication, appropriators 
may not be able to establish all elements of prescription under specific 
facts.112  Finally, the existence of overdraft is not a necessary precondition to 
adjudication; as a result, adjudication will not always result in 
extinguishment of dormant land-based rights to groundwater through 
prescription.113  Thus, the challenge of dormant rights remains. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Quantification of Land-Based Rights: The Ongoing California Saga 
As demand for water has increased, the trend toward quantification of 
dormant land-based rights has increased as well.  Many eastern states 
transitioned their land-based rights to permitting systems.114  Of the western 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 109. See id. at 747.  Not all adjudications result in quantification. See Steve Saxton, The Seaside Basin 
Case: Adjudication Grows Up, 191 CAL. WATER L. & POL’Y REP. (2006). 
 110. See Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10720–37.8 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 491, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 114. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 
53, 85 (2011) (“The process of modifying or abandoning traditional riparian rights continues today, with 
734 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:719 
 
states that have retained land-based doctrines, many tend to ultimately 
modify their rules to incorporate more aspects of a use-based system.115  This 
is due to both physical and economic factors.116  However, in important 
agriculture states such as California and Texas,117 some courts—and a great 
deal of rhetoric—have thus far held fast to the concept of inviolable dormant 
pumping rights.118 
The California Supreme Court addressed the issue of dormant 
land-based rights in Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore 
Irrigation District.119  In that case, one irrigation district sought to quiet title 
to water rights against another irrigation district in the water-scarce Kaweah 
Delta.120  While emphasizing the need to quantify water rights in arid 
California, the Tulare court nonetheless held that inchoate rights to water 
could not be limited by establishing quantities in the present.121  The court 
reasoned that by fixing a definite quantity, the land-based right would lose a 
fundamental, definitional element, the loss of which would transform the 
right into an (implicitly less desirable) appropriative right.122  The court 
explained that to protect the essential value of land-based rights, a trial court 
should declare the future water associated with riparian rights senior to any 
and all appropriative rights, and retain jurisdiction so that the court could 
supervise any new exercise of land-based rights in the future.123 
The rule of Tulare was subsequently altered in part by the California 
legislature, at least as the rule applies to surface water.  At the time Tulare 
was decided, controversies over water were typically brought to the court in 
                                                                                                                 
many eastern states abandoning classic riparian rights in favor of a new permit system that is based on 
riparian, rather than appropriative, principles.”). 
 115. Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 299–300. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Riparian 
Rights in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 51, 59–70 (1990) (discussing the theory of a dual system of water 
rights in western states). 
 116. See Hutchins & Steele, supra note 2, at 299–300. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 115. 
 117. Farm Income and Wealth Statistics, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/farm-
income-and-wealth-statistics/cash-receipts-by-commodity-state-ranking.aspx  (last updated Feb. 9, 2016).  
In 2014, the top ten agricultural producing states in terms of cash receipts were the following (in 
descending order): California, Iowa, Nebraska, Texas, Illinois, Minnesota, Kansas, North Carolina, 
Indiana, and Wisconsin. Id. 
 118. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 152–53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, 
pet. denied) (holding that a property owner was entitled to “unlimited” pumping from the Edwards 
Aquifer); Gies, supra note 3; Meckler, supra note 6; Jim Nielsen, California Seeks to Take Farm Water 
Rights, SF GATE (Aug. 27, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/ 
California-seeks-to-take-farm-water-rights-5716603.php; Allen Young, Farmers Fight Drought-Inspired 
Regulation of Groundwater Pumping, SACRAMENTO BUS. J. (July 18, 2014, 7:06 AM), http://www.biz 
journals.com/sacramento/news/2014/07/18/farmers-fight-drought-inspired-regulation-of.html. 
 119. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 975 (Cal. 1935). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 986. 
 122. Id. (explaining that the quantity for future riparian uses “cannot be fixed in amount until the need 
for such use arises”); see also Seneca Consol. Gold Mines Co. v. Great W. Power Co., 287 P. 93, 98 (Cal. 
1930) (“The moment a right in a natural stream is specifically defined in a concrete inflexible amount, at 
that moment the right becomes one of priority and not riparian.”). 
 123. Tulare Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d at 986. 
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the form of private lawsuits between individual water users.124  Such 
litigation can only bind the parties involved in a suit; given the physical 
reality of water as a shared resource, third parties not bound by a ruling could 
upset whatever balance had been struck in court.125  Bringing every third 
party into court one-by-one as conflicts arose would be overly expensive and 
demand excessive space on courts’ dockets.126  To address this issue, in 1943, 
California added provisions to the Water Code authorizing the state’s 
regulatory body for water rights—now the California State Water Resources 
Control Board (SWRCB)—to conduct a comprehensive adjudication of all 
rights to a river or stream system.127  The Water Code provisions contain 
extensive notice procedures to ensure that all property owners have the 
opportunity to participate.128  In issuing a final decree, the agency is required 
to “define the right[s]” by confirming, among other elements, quantities for 
all rights on the system.129  Once the agency issues a final decree, it is binding 
on all water right holders, and future claimants are estopped from asserting 
rights not adjudicated.130 
1.  California’s Long Valley Decision 
The question of how these adjudication provisions would affect dormant 
rights rose to the surface in California’s Sierra Valley in Rowland v. Ramelli 
(In Re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System).131  In that case, long-
running conflicts in several counties resulted in a comprehensive stream 
adjudication at the SWRCB pursuant to the above-described Water Code 
provisions.132  An unhappy landowner appealed the decision, in part 
challenging the SWRCB’s authority to quantify the dormant elements of his 
land-based right.133 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 660–61 
(Cal. 1979). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Meridian, Ltd. v. City of San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537, 553 (Cal. 1939) (“This method of 
resolving controversies involving the rights of the users of water on the river is necessarily piecemeal, 
unduly expensive and obviously unsatisfactory.”). 
 127. See CAL. WATER CODE § 2525 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.). 
 128. Id. §§ 2526–29. 
 129. Id. § 2769.  
The decree shall in every case declare as to the water right adjudged to each party, the priority, 
amount, season of use, purpose of use, point of diversion, and place of use of the water; and as 
to water used for irrigation, the decree shall also declare the specific tracts of land to which it 
is appurtenant, together with such other factors as may be necessary to define the right. 
Id. 
 130. Id. §§ 2773–74.  Decrees issued by the SWRCB in stream system adjudications are appealable 
to the California courts. Id. § 2771. 
 131. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 658–59 
(Cal. 1979). 
 132. Id. at 659. 
 133. Id. at 660. 
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On appeal, the Long Valley court sided with the SWRCB.134  The court 
held that quantification of dormant rights is required to fulfill the legislature’s 
purpose in enacting the stream adjudication provisions, namely, sustainable 
management of the water resource.135  The court did caution that under 
constitutional standards, courts must protect the land-based right from total 
extinguishment, i.e., a court cannot simply declare that a water right no longer 
exists.136  Courts must protect land-based water rights as property rights 
consistent with constitutional principles.137  However, the court upheld the 
power of the SWRCB to take actions that limit or alter dormant land-based 
water rights by fixing the nature, scope, and extent of those rights, as long as 
the change does not equate to total extinguishment.138  The court explained 
that in areas of scarce water resources, such as in arid California, it is not 
reasonable to allow undefined and unlimited rights when they can be 
integrated without destroying the entire property right.139  The court 
explained its divergence from Tulare and similar cases by reasoning that 
there is a difference between piecemeal private adjudication and a 
comprehensive statutory adjudication; whereas the former cannot guarantee 
due process to a land-based right holder, the statutory adjudication 
procedures were specifically designed to provide all required due process via 
extensive notice, hearing, and other procedures.140 
As a result of Long Valley, California courts may approve a decree that 
limits the nature, scope, and extent of unexercised riparian rights to surface 
water without violating the takings clause.141  However, as described below, 
this rule has not yet been applied to groundwater. 
2.  The Goleta Court Declines to Apply Long Valley to Groundwater 
After Long Valley, the question naturally arose, could dormant 
land-based rights to groundwater also be limited?  The courts had already 
recognized that land-based rights to groundwater are analogous to land-based 
rights to surface water, and that generally the same principles should apply.142  
The dormant-right question was raised before California’s Second District 
Court of Appeal in Wright v. Goleta Water District.143  This case pitted 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 660–61, 665–66. 
 136. Id. at 665. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 664–66. 
 140. Id.; cf. Meridian, Ltd. v. City of San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537, 553 (Cal. 1939) (“[The case-by-
case] method of resolving controversies involving the rights of the users of water on the river is necessarily 
piecemeal, unduly expensive and obviously unsatisfactory.”).   
 141. See In re Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 669. 
 142. See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 143. Id. at 743. 
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landowners claiming senior rights to groundwater against a special district 
water supplier.144  The overlying landowners brought the action against the 
water district to determine their relative rights to water in the basin; the 
defendant water district cross-complained against other land-based and 
use-based water right holders, seeking a determination of the basin’s safe 
yield and a decree designed to avoid overdraft.145  The trial court determined 
that the existing, exercised rights of the water district and others were senior 
to dormant rights of certain land-based claimants, and allocated prospective 
rights based on these priority determinations.146 
On appeal, the court reversed this determination.147  The appellate court 
held that, although the SWRCB may adjust priorities for dormant land-based 
rights, this authority does not exist when there are insufficient protections for 
property right holders.148  The court noted that the comprehensive stream 
adjudication procedures were carefully designed to include certain notice and 
other requirements to ensure adequate due process to water right holders, and 
that without those standards, a lawsuit could not bind nonparticipating 
property owners.149  However, the court left open the possibility that a 
comprehensive procedure could be designed for groundwater that would 
provide the same kind of protections that are afforded to surface water users 
by the Water Code.150 
This potential was subsequently discussed with approval by the 
California Supreme Court in City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency.151  In 
Mojave, the court considered whether water could be allocated in litigation 
according to equitable principles rather than priority.152  The court held that 
when fashioning a solution to oversubscription of a water system, a decree 
may adjust, but may not wholly disregard, water right priorities.153  In so 
holding, the court described Wright, noting that Wright protects dormant 
rights, and again signaled the importance of the property right in priority.154  
However, in a much-perused footnote, the court mused in dicta that a trial 
court could conceivably apply the Long Valley principles to groundwater if 
land-based right holders were afforded the same due process protections 
provided by the stream adjudication provisions of the Water Code.155  The 
court noted that to fulfill the quest to “harmonize water shortages with a fair 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 750. 
 148. Id. at 749–50. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 862–63 (Cal. 2000). 
 152. Id. at 858. 
 153. Id. at 869. 
 154. Id. (citing Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 743, 745). 
 155. Id. at 868 n.13. 
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allocation of future use,” courts should have some ability to limit future 
groundwater use by a land-based right holder.156 
3.  California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and Dormant 
Groundwater Rights 
Although California’s failure to manage groundwater basins 
comprehensively has been harshly criticized for a long time, reform has been 
slow.  Concern over the state’s dwindling groundwater resources heightened 
between 2007–2014, when the state struggled through an eight-year period 
of nearly continuous drought; over that period, the anxieties of long-term 
drought and the specter of failing groundwater basins awakened a new 
political will.157  Previously unknown coalitions emerged ready to support a 
new approach to groundwater management, and in 2014 this creative energy 
resulted in the passage of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
(SGMA).158 
SGMA is designed to achieve a sustainable allocation of groundwater 
in heavily pumped basins by empowering locals to create their own solutions, 
continuing California’s long tradition of local management of groundwater 
resources.159  SGMA establishes that the state will not step in unless and until 
local agencies fail to meet certain planning requirements or fail to achieve 
sustainability.160  The Act requires the creation of new local entities, called 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
If Californians expect to harmonize water shortages with a fair allocation of future use, courts 
should have some discretion to limit the future groundwater use of an overlying owner who 
has exercised the water right and to reduce to a reasonable level the amount the overlying user 
takes from an overdrafted basin. 
Id. 
 157. Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of the California 
Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 5–6 (2015); Groundwater 
Problems and Prospects, Part 2: The Story Behind the Passage of the Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act, MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK (Mar. 19, 2015), http://mavensnotebook.com/2015/03/19/ 
groundwater-problems-and-prospects-part-2-the-story-behind-the-passage-of-the-sustainable-
groundwater-management-act/. 
 158. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.). 
 159. Id. § 10720.1(b) (“In enacting this part, it is the intent of the Legislature to . . . enhance local 
management of groundwater consistent with rights to use or store groundwater and Section 2 of Article X 
of the California Constitution.”); id. § 10720.1(d) (“To provide local groundwater agencies with the 
authority and the technical and financial assistance necessary to sustainably manage groundwater.”); id. 
§ 10720.1(h) (“To manage groundwater basins through the actions of local governmental agencies to the 
greatest extent feasible, while minimizing state intervention to only when necessary to ensure that local 
agencies manage groundwater in a sustainable manner.”); see also City of Santa Maria v. Adam, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 491, 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“There is no statewide system for allocating rights in groundwater.  
The Legislature has left that to local government or, as here, to adjudication by the courts.” (citing O.W.L. 
Found. v. City of Rohnert Park, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008))). 
 160. CAL. WATER § 10735.4(c) (stating that the SWRCB) may develop interim plan if local agency 
has not addressed deficiency resulting in probationary status); id. § 10735.8 (stating that the SWRCB has 
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groundwater sustainability agencies, which will have the power and the 
obligation to identify water sustainability objectives for their own 
groundwater basin and to adopt a management plan designed to achieve those 
objectives.161  The objectives must avoid certain undesirable conditions such 
as seawater intrusion and subsidence, and SGMA terms the absence of those 
conditions “sustainable yield.”162  Sustainable yield is defined similarly to the 
common law “safe yield” standard.163 
SGMA as originally enacted did not address the problem left open by 
Goleta and Mojave, i.e., whether courts can limit dormant land-based rights 
to groundwater.164  This omission was addressed the following year by 
Assembly Bill (AB) 1390, a bill that created comprehensive groundwater 
adjudication procedures by amending the state’s Code of Civil Procedure.165  
Signed by Governor Jerry Brown on October 9, 2015, AB 1390 stated that 
courts should interpret the new provision as adding “notice and due process 
sufficient to enable a court in a comprehensive adjudication conducted 
pursuant to this chapter to determine and establish the priority for 
unexercised water rights.  The court may consider applying the principles 
established in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 
Cal.3d 339.”166  The bill acknowledged that this provision, unlike other 
aspects of the bill, may be interpreted to alter groundwater law.167  By 
providing these protective due process procedures, AB 1390 attempts to fix 
the problem identified by the Goleta court so that courts can quantify 
land-based rights to groundwater, including dormant rights. 
AB 1390 makes this suggestion only with respect to adjudication, and 
does not address whether groundwater sustainability agencies can likewise 
limit dormant land-based rights as they attempt to limit pumping to safe yield 
                                                                                                                 
authority to adopt interim plans and the content of the plans); id. § 10735.8(g)(1) (stating that the SWRCB 
may determine whether sustainability plan will achieve sustainable yield). 
 161. Id. § 10721(j) (groundwater sustainability agencies (GSAs)); id. §§ 10725–26.9 (powers and 
authorities of GSAs); id. § 10721(k) (groundwater sustainability plans (GSPs)); id. §§ 1027–728.6 (GSPs). 
 162. Id. § 10721(w) (sustainable yield); id. § 10721(x) (undesirable results). 
 163. See Alfred Smith, Water Rules: California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
Provides a Comprehensive Set of Tools for Local Agencies to Implement Groundwater Management 
Plans, 37 L.A. LAW., Feb. 2015, at 18, 23 (referencing the connection between SGMA and common-law 
safe yield standards). Compare CAL. WATER § 10721(w) (sustainable yield), and id. § 10721(x) 
(undesirable results), with CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA: A 
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO WATER CODE SECTION 12924 60 (1980), http://www. 
water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_118/ground_water_basins_in_california_bulletin_118-80_/ 
b118_80_ground_water_ocr.pdf (describing safe yield as “the maximum quantity of water that can be 
continuously withdrawn from a groundwater basin without adverse effect”). Cf. Leahy, supra note 157, at 
35 & n.176 (concluding that both standards were ambiguous pre-SGMA). 
 164. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); Wright v. Goleta Water 
Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
 165. 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 672 (AB 1390) (West) (codified at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 830). 
 166. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 830(b)(7) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 
of 2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.). 
 167. Id. 
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under SGMA.168  That issue remains to be addressed either in future 
legislation or on a case-by-case basis during the SGMA process. 
B.  Quantification of Dormant Rights Is Necessary to Protect the Common 
Pool Resource of Groundwater 
In business circles there is a saying that “you can’t manage what you 
don’t measure,” an adage that has been embraced by groundwater 
management advocates in California.169  Along these lines, the California 
Supreme Court in Long Valley recognized that in the surface water context, 
dormant rights create “pernicious effects” and inhibit planning that would 
protect the public interest.170  Scientists and policy experts likewise recognize 
that quantification is necessary to ensure the continued viability of heavily 
pumped groundwater basins.171  In fact, accurate data and quantitative 
management have been identified as basic requirements for sustainable 
human use of a common pool resource.172  More specifically, studies 
demonstrate that successful groundwater management requires quantitative 
standards for groundwater levels and individual pumping, combined with 
monitoring and enforcement.173  In one example, experts specifically 
attributed management success to quantification; in that case, pumping limits 
were assigned to all rights in a court adjudication, and post-judgment the 
parties were required to report annual pumping to each other in an open and 
public process.174  This framework provided protection against excess 
pumping by any individual property owner, which in turn protected 
everyone’s property interests in the common pool of groundwater.175  The 
key was that everyone knew how much the other was allowed to pump, and 
that total pumping was set at a level that would quantitatively protect the core 
groundwater resource from depletion.176 
In California, it might be argued that there is no need to quantify 
dormant rights because, when overlying owners are ready to exercise their 
                                                                                                                 
 168. 2015 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 672 (AB 1390) (West). 
 169. See Anna North, California’s Big Groundwater Problem, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (July 22, 
2015, 2:43 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/californias-big-groundwater-problem/ 
?_r=0.  The concept is often said to originate with management guru Peter Drucker, who allegedly said, 
“If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it,” although the Drucker Institute maintains that he “never 
actually said it.” Paul Zak, Measurement Myopia, DRUCKER INST. (July 4, 2013), http://www.drucker 
institute.com/2013/07/measurement-myopia/. 
 170. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 661 (Cal. 
1979). 
 171. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4 (recommending quantification of groundwater rights as one of 
the top reforms needed to ensure sustainable groundwater). 
 172. Ostrom, supra note 22. 
 173. OSTROM, supra note 20. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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rights, the priority system dictates that those land-based uses will simply 
displace lower priority appropriators.177  This argument ignores important 
factors.  First, in reality, later uses do not typically supplant existing uses; 
new uses are simply added to existing uses, thus increasing the total demand 
on the basin and paving the way toward overdraft.  Second, once a 
groundwater basin is in overdraft, existing uses may legally supplant 
unexercised groundwater rights under the doctrine of prescription.178  In this 
regard, quantification of dormant rights can help protect those rights by 
allowing landowners to take steps to avoid prescription by appropriative 
users, and by correcting the “pernicious effect” that uncertainty about future 
pumping has on groundwater management.179  
C.  Beyond Reasonable Use: Inherent Limits on Private Property Rights in 
Common Pool, Depletable Resources 
Because the Long Valley court cloaked its decision to quantify dormant 
water rights in the authority of the reasonable use doctrine, the analysis does 
not, of course, apply in a nonreasonable use jurisdiction such as Texas.180  
However, this Article proposes that the Long Valley reasoning is not 
exclusive; there is another principle leading to the same outcome, and this 
principle applies in all jurisdictions.  This more broadly applicable principle 
has two components: 
 
(1) As a matter of physical reality, there is an inherent limit on the  
  quantity of distributable private property rights in a common pool 
  depletable resource.181 
(2) There is no property right to deplete a common pool resource 
beyond recovery.182 
 
Under the foregoing, limits on property rights are defined by the nature of the 
property itself as a common pool, depletable resource.183  In an overdrafted 
or nearly overdrafted basin, unquantified dormant rights are inconsistent with 
these limits.184  This Article proposes that honoring these limits requires 
quantification of dormant land-based rights, particularly in heavily pumped 
basins, based on the following principles:  
                                                                                                                 
 177. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d 656, 664 (Cal. 
1979). 
 178. Id. at 663 n.6. 
 179. Id. at 662 (describing the negative effects of uncertainty); GRAY ET AL., supra note 4 (explaining 
that quantification is critical to protecting groundwater). 
 180. See In re Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 665. 
 181. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4; Ostrom, supra note 22. 
 182. See Dellapenna, supra note 12. 
 183. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4; Ostrom, supra note 22. 
 184. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4; Ostrom, supra note 22. 
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First, available rights are limited by the capacity of the resource.185  The 
following example illustrates this concept.  Assume that several people hold 
individual rights to a blueberry pie.  The scope of each individual’s initial 
rights is defined by the size of their slice, and the cumulative rights are 
necessarily fixed by the size of the pie.  Although their individual slices may 
not be equal, the cumulative value of their rights cannot exceed the amount 
of pie available.  If the pie is smaller, at least some shares must get 
proportionally smaller. 
Second, the property right itself includes an inherent duty to use the 
resource so as not to damage the renewability of the resource.186  Here we 
must part from the pie example—after all, who wouldn’t want to eat an entire 
blueberry pie?  But groundwater is property of a different kind, and that 
makes all the difference.  Groundwater is a common pool, depletable 
resource that is critical to human health and safety, environmental and 
economic viability, and quality of life.187  For this reason, if not for others, 
each individual property right in the common pool resource is impressed with 
an inherent obligation to protect the sustainability of the resource against 
destruction.188  As explored below, this inherent obligation is arguably 
already reflected in existing principles within the general law of property as 
well as within concepts specific to water law, including the absence of a right 
to destroy common pool resources, the broadly recognized prohibition 
against the waste of water, the public trust doctrine, and the sovereign ability 
to regulate property by way of the police power. 
1.  No Right to Destroy 
The right to destroy, or jus abutendi, is commonly listed among the 
sticks in the bundle of property rights.189  Some scholars take the position that 
jus abutendi has not received much treatment in the law beyond its classical 
origins and is increasingly treated with hostility in contemporary society.190  
Others maintain that the right clearly exists in, and is integrated into, 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Griggs, supra note 10 (“Candor thus compels us to reconsider the groundwater right itself: in 
obedience to the actual hydrological bases upon which the right depends, in accordance with its actual 
rather than perceived legal status . . . .”); Fennell, supra note 26, at 13 (discussing how the attributes of a 
resource influence property rights). 
 186. See GRAY ET AL., supra note 4. 
 187. See Fennell, supra note 26, at 13. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., Clifford W. Schulz & Gregory S. Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Towards 
Property Rights in California Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. 
L.J. 1031, 1035 n.13 (1988) (identifying the fundamental attributes of property as jus possidendi, jus 
prohibendi, jas utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi, and jus disponendi (citing Roscoe Pound, The Changing 
Role of Property in American Jurisprudence, 12 UNIV. CHI. CONF. 31, 33–34 (1953))). 
 190. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 786 (2005) (“In the twentieth 
century, the right to destroy fell out of favor, and the most recent literature has argued that such a right, if 
it exists at all, should be substantially circumscribed on public policy grounds.”). 
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contemporary society, albeit with limits and boundaries.191  Despite their 
differences, these scholars agree that when the right does exist, it likely 
attaches to those forms of property that have a certain degree of common 
value such as works of art, historical properties, cultural resources, and, 
notably, land and natural resources.192 
It appears that the concept of jus abutendi has not been explored in any 
significant way in the context of depletable, common pool resources like 
groundwater.193  Yet the logic applies: if the right to destroy personal property 
that has substantial common value is limited, then, rationally, the right of an 
individual to destroy common resources should also be similarly limited.  
This notion should be particularly true when the resource is, like 
groundwater, not only economically and environmentally valuable, but also 
necessary for communal health and safety. 
2.  Prohibition Against Waste of Water 
The idea that common pool rights are inherently limited commensurate 
with the capacity of that common pool is arguably already enshrined in 
prohibitions against waste of water found in common law, statutory, and 
constitutional authorities.194  Historically, waste has been defined as use in 
excess of need and/or use divergent from social norms.195  Judicial and 
agency findings of waste typically involve a context-specific analysis, 
depending on variables such as water availability, competing demands, and 
custom.196  To date, waste is largely a forgiving concept that does not attempt 
to force technology or substantially alter the status quo, allowing “a wide 
range of acceptable conduct” and censoring only the most egregious 
actions.197 
And yet—despite the “low expectations” associated with the waste 
doctrine—a prohibition against waste must, if it is to mean anything, impose 
an expectation that a resource cannot be mined to nothingness.  Surely 
                                                                                                                 
 191. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 293–304 (2014). 
 192. Id. at 302–04 (describing limits on the right to destroy land and natural resources); see 
Strahilevitz, supra note 190. 
 193. Compare Schulz & Weber, supra note 189 (discussing the concept of jus abutendi), with 
OSTROM, supra note 20 and accompanying sources (discussing groundwater as a common pool resource 
without reference to jus abutendi). 
 194. E.g., State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1051 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“From an 
early date, courts announced the rule that no appropriation of water was valid where the water simply 
went to waste.”). 
 195. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 975 (Cal. 1935) (holding that 
flooding fields in winter to kill gophers is a waste of water); Neuman, supra note 47, at 933 (“[W]aste can 
be legally defined as the amount of flow diverted in excess of reasonable needs under customary 
practices.” (quoting Steven J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. 
REV. 483, 491 (1982))). 
 196. Neuman, supra note 47, at 933. 
 197. Id. at 940. 
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complete destruction must equate to waste, at least absent a social agreement 
to destroy that resource.198  Likewise, because the waste doctrine protects 
water resources against (at least some) individual acts of excessive use, then 
logically the doctrine must protect the resource against the biggest hit of all, 
i.e., destruction of the resource.  If, for example, flooding fields to kill 
gophers is a waste of water because it renders water unavailable for others, 
then the destruction represented by allowing groundwater to be pumped until 
the resource cannot be recovered should also be waste. 199 
Although judicial decisions do not reflect a strong or assertive waste 
doctrine, this does not necessarily mean that the principles of waste are weak 
or that a strong doctrine does not or cannot exist.200  The concept of waste is 
evolving in the public sphere as science progresses and cultural policies 
integrate notions of intergenerational equity.201  Statutes, regulations, 
ordinances, and other authorities establishing policies for water use regularly 
declare sustainability and the preservation of a resource for future generations 
to be a core principle; these pronouncements underscore a connection 
between the doctrine of waste and long-term preservation of common pool 
water resources.202  From this perspective, it appears that courts may not be 
the primary forum for evolution of the doctrine, and therefore one would not 
necessarily expect to see the concept evolve in that forum—or, at least, the 
next stage of evolution may not have yet reached the courts.203   
3.  Public Trust 
The public trust doctrine is another potential manifestation of a 
prohibition against destruction of a common pool resource.204  The public 
trust doctrine posits that certain natural resources are held in common by the 
people, and that thus there is a duty to make careful choices about the use of 
those resources for the benefit of present and future generations.205  Although 
there are varying theories about the origin of the public trust doctrine, it is 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. at 933–49. 
 199. See Tulare Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d at 1006–07. 
 200. See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 47, at 940. 
 201. See Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2231 (2013) 
(connecting waste of water resources associated with water being withdrawn faster than natural 
replenishment to impacts on human health and intergenerational equity). See generally Edith Brown 
Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19 
(1992) (describing the concept of intergenerational equity and sustainability in the context of natural 
resources). 
 202. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831 (Tex. 2012) (stating that “regulation must 
take into account not only historical usage but future needs”). 
 203. See Larson, supra note 201, at 2230–32. 
 204. See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 4 (Carolina Acad. Press 2013). 
 205. See id. (“The [public trust doctrine] requires governmental trustees to manage the resources that 
are in the corpus of the trust as a long-term steward for the benefit of both present and future generations.”). 
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often said that the principle traces to ancient Roman law, under which the 
sovereign had a duty to protect common natural resources including the air, 
sea, and seashores.206  The scope of the public trust doctrine as applied to 
water resources is determined separately by each U.S. state according to their 
individual law and priorities;207 each state independently determines which 
environmental resources and values are protected by the doctrine.208 
In California, the public trust doctrine has been interpreted to protect the 
beds and banks of navigable and tidally influenced waters acquired under the 
equal footing doctrine.209  The scope of the doctrine in California is based on 
the idea that the public trust is inherently part of the title to federal lands, that 
Congress conveyed title to all public lands within each state to each state that 
entered the Union, and that this title as conveyed was impressed with the 
public trust obligation.210  As a result, the public trust doctrine may be 
powerful where it applies but, at least in the California water context, appears 
to be limited in application to activities that directly or indirectly affect 
navigable and tidally influenced waters.211 
Ongoing litigation in California raises the question whether 
groundwater pumping that impacts a navigable surface water, the Scott River, 
is within the scope of the public trust doctrine; an early decision by a superior 
court has held that the doctrine applies.212  In so holding, the superior court 
invokes the causal connection between groundwater pumping and surface 
water impacts as the basis for its application of the doctrine to 
groundwater.213  This reasoning is based on the seminal California Supreme 
Court decision applying the public trust to water resources, National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, which held that non-navigable waters are 
within the scope of the doctrine when diversion of those waters affect 
navigable waters impressed with the trust.214  Notably, under the National 
Audubon analysis, the public trust doctrine does not apply absent an impact 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (“By the law of nature 
these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the 
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 208. Id.; Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); 
Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, 
Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56 (2010). 
 209. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 709. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. But see Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative 
State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1122–35 (2012) (concluding that the public trust doctrine has not 
independently affected the outcome of environmental conflicts). 
 212. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583, 2014 WL 8843074, 
at *7–10 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014). 
 213. Id. at *8–9. 
 214. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 720–21. 
746 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:719 
 
on navigable waters.215  As of this writing, the Scott River litigation raising 
the issue of application of the trust to groundwater is still pending in superior 
court.216  If the court’s determination and reasoning are upheld on appeal, 
which seems likely (both the appeal and the upholding), then the outcome 
will be that at least certain groundwater basins—basins in which pumping 
affects navigable surface water—would be subject to public trust 
protections.217  However, basins lacking such connection would not be 
subject to the doctrine, at least absent legislative or judicial expansion.218 
The public trust doctrine also applies to navigable waters in Texas.219  
In this regard, although it is clear that Texas has the power to regulate 
groundwater that is held in private ownership,220 Texas courts have not 
addressed the application of the public trust to groundwater that is 
hydrologically connected to surface water.221  In this and other contexts, the 
scope of the public trust doctrine’s application to natural resources in Texas 
is still being explored.222 
Some scholars argue for a broader conception of the public trust 
doctrine, one that would apply the doctrine to every exercise of the 
government’s sovereign power over natural resources, not just navigable and 
tidally influenced resources.223  Others argue that application of the doctrine 
does not depend on title, and that it is instead a function of the sovereign’s 
duty to protect the common resources of the people.224  There are a few court 
decisions along these lines: In California, one appellate court held that the 
doctrine applied to birds.225  In Texas, a district court held that the doctrine 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (“The 
water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of 
every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every river, 
natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the state is the property of the state.”); id. 
§ 11.0235 (“The waters of the state are held in trust for the public, and the right to use state water may be 
appropriated only as expressly authorized by law.”); see also Cummins v. Travis Cty. Water Control & 
Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.3d 34, 49 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (holding that Texas 
Water Code § 11.021 supports application of the public trust doctrine to navigable waters in Texas). 
 220. See TEX. WATER § 11.021. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 
3164561, at *1–2 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Aug. 2, 2012), vacated on other grounds, 438 
S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.). 
 223. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 185, 185 (1980). 
 224. E.g., Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property 
Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 520 (1989) (“Indeed, California courts established that this easement exists as a 
consequence of state sovereignty; consequently it does not depend on a showing of prior state ownership 
of the resource.”). 
 225. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 606–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2008). But cf. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (2008) 
(“There is doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrines—the protection of water resources 
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applied to air, a decision that was later vacated on other grounds.226  The state 
of Hawaii has adopted a very broad conception of the public trust doctrine, 
under which all natural resources are protected for present and future 
generations.227  Under these broadest conceptions of the doctrine, the public 
trust would preclude “unlimited” pumping rights, the exercise of which 
would cause total depletion of groundwater resources. 
Another consideration is that, even when the public trust doctrine does 
apply, interpretive principles may affect the utility of the doctrine in 
protecting common pool groundwater.  Under the law of some states, the 
public trust doctrine does not automatically require decision-makers such as 
agencies or courts to prevent environmental harm.228  For example, in 
California, decision-makers determine whether environmental protection is 
“feasible” based on a variety of economic, environmental, scientific, 
technological, and other factors.229  The California Supreme Court has stated 
that, as a matter of practical reality, sometimes water use must be allowed 
even when it results in environmental harm.230  And yet, even under an 
interpretive standard such as feasibility, which permits some harm to trust 
resources in favor of other values, a water use that threatens to entirely 
deplete the core resource would, or at least arguably should, tip the scales in 
favor of protection. 
4.  Sovereignty and Police Power 
The sovereign and police powers of a state encompass the ability to 
regulate for the common health, safety, and welfare, and include the authority 
to adopt laws to protect a common natural resource from depletion.231  States 
                                                                                                                 
is intertwined with the protection of wildlife. . . .  Nonetheless the duty of government agencies to protect 
wildlife is primarily statutory.”). 
 226. Bonser-Lain, 2012 WL 3164561, at *1–2 (holding that the public trust doctrine is not limited to 
navigable water, but “includes all natural resources of the State including the air and atmosphere . . . ‘the 
preservation and conservation of [the] natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public 
rights and duties” (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59)). 
 227. HAW. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (amended 1978). 
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall 
conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, 
air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these 
resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the 
self-sufficiency of the State.  All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the 
benefit of the people. 
Id.; see also id. §§ 3, 7; In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 409 (Haw. 2000). 
 228. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 711–12, 727 (Cal. 1983). 
 229. Id. at 712. 
 230. Id. at 727–28. 
 231. See, e.g., Fall River Valley Irr. Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 259 P. 444, 449 (Cal. 1927) 
(acknowledging that state police power can be invoked to prohibit a use of property that “reasonably 
endangers or threatens the public health, safety, comfort, or welfare” (quoting Stone v. Kendall, 268 S.W. 
759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1925, no writ))); cf. CAL. CONST., art. XI, § 7 (discussing police power 
of local governments).  Professor Joseph Dellapenna suggests that the police power is closely connected 
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routinely exercise their power to protect the common resource of 
groundwater, whether operating through their legislature or their courts.232  
For example, California adopted the idea of managing for “safe yield” in 
early groundwater adjudication decisions, a standard that requires 
groundwater to be managed so that pumping does not exceed the level at 
which the basin can replenish itself over the long term.233  The California 
legislature reasserted this power in 2014 by adopting a statewide mandate to 
manage for “sustainable yield.”234  Local governments in California may also 
invoke the police power to manage groundwater.235  Texas likewise has 
repeatedly acknowledged the power of the state to regulate to protect the 
health of a groundwater basin, a power that expressly references 
quantification.236  Politics aside, these sovereign authorities are, as a matter 
of law, sufficient to preclude recognition of claims to private rights to 
unlimited pumping sufficient to destroy the groundwater resource; it is 
inconsistent for a state to exercise its sovereign authority to regulate to protect 
groundwater resources and simultaneously recognize an unlimited private 
right to destroy those same resources. 
This contradiction raises the question whether, in acknowledging the 
impossibility of an unlimited right to pump and/or requiring quantification of 
dormant rights, a state would go “too far,” thereby entitling a dormant right 
holder to compensation under federal or state takings principles.237  When 
groundwater is properly characterized as a depletable common pool resource, 
any argument for compensation dissolves; in requiring quantification to 
protect the common pool, a state would not be changing property rights to 
groundwater—it would simply be acknowledging the physical character of 
the resource in which the property right is held.  No political or legal rhetoric 
can alter the fact that there is physically no such thing as an unlimited 
groundwater resource, and thus unlimited rights to groundwater never 
                                                                                                                 
to the right of governments to abate nuisances, an act that does not require compensation to the private 
property owner whose exercise of rights are limited, and also to the “emergency doctrine,” wherein if two 
resources are inevitably going to be destroyed, the government may choose to protect one over the other, 
without compensation. Dellapenna, supra note 12.  Professor Dellapenna further suggests that these 
doctrines are relevant to the question of whether compensation is owed if a government were to clarify 
that no private property right to groundwater is unlimited. Id. 
 232. See generally Dellapenna, supra note 12. 
 233. E.g., City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1315 (Cal. 1975); City of Los 
Angeles v. City of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289, 296–97 (Cal. 1943). 
 234. CAL. WATER CODE § 10721(w) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 
2015–16 2d Exec. Sess.) (defining sustainable yield); id. § 10727(a) (“A groundwater sustainability plan 
shall be developed and implemented for each medium- or high-priority basin by a groundwater 
sustainability agency to meet the sustainability goal established pursuant to this part.”). 
 235. Baldwin v. Cty. of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 891–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
 236. 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 356.10(6) (West 2015) (referencing “[t]he desired, quantified condition 
of groundwater resources (such as water levels, spring flows, or volumes) within a management area at 
one or more specified future times as defined by participating groundwater conservation districts within a 
groundwater management area as part of the joint planning process”). 
 237. See, e.g., Fall River Valley Irr. Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 259 P. 444, 448 (Cal. 1927). 
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existed.  A government cannot take what never existed.  Accordingly, a rule 
requiring quantification would be squarely within the acceptable bounds of 
the police power, and would not equate to a shift of private resources for 
public benefit.238  Of course, the question of compensation might arise for an 
individual property owner if the defined quantity was substantially 
disproportionate to the amount that property owner should reasonably 
anticipate in light of the available water supply and the long-term health of 
the basin. 
D.  Is an Inherent Limit Consistent with State Water Rights Doctrines? 
1.  California 
The inherent limits embodied in the proposed principle are consistent 
with California’s doctrine of reasonable use and prohibition on waste.  
California’s constitution requires that all water resources, including 
groundwater, be used reasonably and to the fullest extent possible.239  
Allowing the destruction of a resource that could be made renewable with 
proper management would not be using water to the fullest extent possible, 
over the long term, and would waste that resource.  And in fact, the 
connection between inherent limits and reasonable use has already been 
recognized by the California Supreme Court in the context of surface water 
in the Long Valley case, discussed above.240 
In the context of California groundwater, some might argue that 
quantification is unnecessary because the problem of dormant rights is 
already corrected by allowing prescriptive rights to groundwater, which are 
generally not recognized in the surface water context.241  However, as 
described above, this is not a complete answer to the problem of dormant 
rights.242 
Others might question why dormant rights are a problem given the 
priority system, under which the California rule is that water is taken away 
from juniors when seniors demand it.  This argument avoids the reality that 
juniors are rarely, if ever, curtailed absent a comprehensive adjudication; 
instead, pumping continues unabated and overdraft occurs.  This curtailment 
fails to occur in part due to a lack of central management, and in part because 
juniors have developed a reliance on the water that they have been using.243  
In this regard, the reliability provided by quantification of pumping rights, 
                                                                                                                 
 238. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). 
 239. CAL. CONST. art X, § 2. 
 240. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 241. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 873–74 (Cal. 1980) (holding there was no prescription against 
the state); cf. Brewer v. Murphy, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 444–46 (Cal. 2008) (recognizing a riparian 
prescription against another riparian owner). 
 242. See supra Part III.B. 
 243. See supra Part II.C. 
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including dormant rights, can encourage junior pumpers to invest in a 
physical solution; conversely, the lack of quantification may, as a practical 
matter, preclude reliability and therefore discourage sustainability-achieving 
physical solutions.244  Studies have demonstrated that the certainty provided 
by quantified water rights can lead to sustainability, improved economic 
reliability, and use of water to the fullest extent possible, consistent with 
California’s fundamental water policy.245 
2.  Texas 
To the extent that the Texas rule of capture applicable to groundwater 
actually bestows unlimited pumping rights, then quantification appears to 
conflict with Texas law.246  Closer examination, however, reveals that there 
is no conflict, because quantification is a natural corollary of an inherent limit 
on the quantity of the resource available for distribution, and not a doctrinal 
rule about who gets how much in distribution of the resource.  Moreover, 
characterization of pumping rights as unlimited stems from interpretation of 
concepts that benefit from close examination.  The term absolute in “absolute 
ownership,” for example, might refer to a fee simple absolute interest in real 
property and its associated water right, rather than an absolute right to pump 
until the basin is entirely drained.247  In other words, it could be that 
landowners possess full ownership interests in the water available to their 
property, rather than a more limited usufructuary interest, easement, or 
license.248  Thus it is possible for a property right in water to be “absolute” 
but still limited by physical availability and an inherent duty to protect the 
core of the common pool resource. 
Similarly, the rule of capture, properly understood, might function 
primarily as a rule of no liability for pumping as against immediately 
neighboring property owners; a functionality arguably present in the facts of 
the foundational cases in which the rule has been applied.249  In those cases, 
the issues seem to revolve around the extent of obligation (or more precisely 
lack thereof) to a neighbor or other individual user, and not around the 
breadth and depth of an individual’s right to pump.250  None of these cases 
explore the character of the property in which the ownership interest is 
located, and none include a declaration that the rule of capture embodies a 
                                                                                                                 
 244. GRAY ET AL., supra note 4. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Sipriano v. Great Spring 
Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). 
 247. See generally Drummond et al., supra note 62. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 5, at 448–49 (noting that rule of capture cases have “focused 
primarily on liability for groundwater use, not ownership of the resource itself”). 
 250. Id. 
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social agreement to destroy a common pool resource.251  The rule of capture 
does not appear to have been created to allow landowners to pump with 
abandon until they deplete a shared groundwater resource.252  Consistent with 
the foregoing, despite continuing rhetoric about unlimited rights to pump, 
Texas in fact recognizes various exceptions to unlimited pumping and 
prohibits pumping that equates to trespass, malicious conduct, or waste, as 
well as pumping that results in contamination or land subsidence.253 
Rhetoric aside, Texas law already recognizes the reality of the common 
pool.254  The legislature has declared that conservation of groundwater 
resources is required to fulfill the will of the people of Texas as expressed in 
the state constitution, which in turn declares conservation for present and 
future generations to be a public right and duty.255  The reality of inherent 
limits and the tool of quantification reflect and further these declarations, and 
thus, should be integrated into judicial determinations regarding the scope of 
rights to groundwater. 
E.  Quantification Does Not Require Inflexible Management 
If a sustainability limit is inherent in common pool resources, as argued 
here, it does not necessarily follow that management to protect the common 
pool must be inflexible.  In those basins in which sustainable yield is sought 
(or groundwater mining is prohibited) today, the rules do not typically treat 
drawdown that would be unsustainable over the long-term as per se unlawful 
on an annual basis; instead, pumpers may be allowed to exceed sustainable 
limits in a specific period in order to protect certain economic and other 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Drummond et al., supra note 62 (explaining the various exceptions to the general rule of no 
liability). 
 253. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J., concurring) 
(stating that the common law rule of capture “entitles a landowner to withdraw an unlimited amount of 
groundwater”); e.g., WYTHE, supra note 87; Texas Water Law, supra note 72. 
 254. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.101(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(stating that Texas conservation districts shall “consider the public interest in conservation, preservation, 
protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their 
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TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a). 
 255. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a); TEX. WATER § 36.101(a)(4).  
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interests.256  The sustainability limit imposes a duty to not pass the “tipping 
point,” or to otherwise allow pumping to result in unacceptable wasting or 
destruction of the common pool resource.257  Thus, recognition of an inherent 
limit on pumping can coexist with sensitivity to local exigencies, allowing 
for flexible management while protecting the resource in the long-term.  
F.  Quantification Should Happen at the Local Level 
To ensure appropriately flexible management and responsiveness to 
place-based concerns, quantification should happen at the local level.  Both 
Texas and California have embraced the local model of groundwater 
management.  Texas created groundwater conservation districts that develop 
management plans and rules for specific regions.258  California, for its part, 
recently confirmed a longstanding local management philosophy by 
choosing local agencies as the guardians of sustainability on a statewide 
basis.259 California’s Water Code directs that “groundwater sustainability 
agencies” will be made up of one or more existing local water institutions or 
new local entities created for that purpose.260  Sustainability plans will focus 
on the regional and local groundwater resource, and local institutions are 
tasked with development of solutions.261  Under California law, the state 
government has little role to play unless and until the locals fail to meet a 
mandatory standard, and even then the state thus far seems to be committed 
to local solutions where possible.262   
In both states, approaches to groundwater management reflect a 
recognition that locally developed rules and local solutions are a core feature 
of endurable institutions for management of a common pool 
resource.263  Local action tends to be more politically palatable to 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 13, at 297–98. 
 257. See DAN A. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 6.15 (2000).  Colorado, New 
Mexico, and Oklahoma have expressly adopted tables that allow for managed exceedance of safe yield, 
not to exceed a tipping point to total exhaustion. Id. 
 258. See TEX. WATER §§ 36.0011–.012 (groundwater conservation districts). 
 259. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.1(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 
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 260. CAL. WATER § 10721(j). 
 261. Id. § 10721(v). 
 262. See id. § 70210. 
 263. OSTROM, supra note 20. 
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groundwater rights holders than state regulation. Local rules reflect the 
particular conditions of the particular resource,264 leaving the most room for 
flexible management that integrates the rights and needs of individual water 
users while still protecting the common resource.  Quantification and 
subsequent management should happen at the local level, provided that the 
local process respects the rights of all groundwater users, including 
disadvantaged communities, and considers impacts upon dependent 
ecosystems. 
G.  Addressing Objections: Law, Economics, Technology, and Cost 
In any given basin, there are several potential reasons why groundwater 
rights have not been quantified.  First, property owners maintain that the right 
cannot be legally quantified.265  Second, property owners take a political 
stance against quantification because they fear that this path leads to 
substantial reduction in economic value.266  Third, quantification is 
conceptually and technically difficult.267  Each of these reasons is addressed 
below. 
As explained in this Article, the first objection is based on an incorrect 
understanding of the law.  There is no such thing as an unlimited property 
right to a common pool depletable resource.268  Unlimited property rights lead 
to depletion, and there is no property right to permanently deplete a natural 
resource that serves health and safety interests as well as critical economic 
and environmental interests.269  It is true that a property owner may have a 
right to a share of the scarce or dwindling supplies, but this right is not 
unlimited and cannot push the resource past its tipping point.270  
Quantification of rights to groundwater is essential to ensure the continued 
viability of the common pool resource. 
The second objection is also misplaced.  In heavily pumped basins, 
quantification will actually improve the real (as opposed to imagined) value 
of the water right for several reasons.  First, a depleted basin provides no 
water.  Second, in a depleting basin, dormant property owners that do not 
hold quantified rights are at significant risk of existing users developing a 
                                                                                                                 
 264. Id.; see also Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1514 (1984) 
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reliance on their supply that cannot practically be overcome.271  Quantifying 
the rights puts everyone on notice that rights may be claimed in the future, 
and helps users to understand how much should be invested in alternative 
supplies as part of a resilient water supply portfolio.  Third, quantification of 
an inchoate, land-based right informs the property owner about data critical 
to rational choices about future investments: i.e., the property owner will 
know how much water the property will actually be able to access in the 
future versus an ambiguous, rhetorical claim to water that likely will not exist 
in the future.272  Quantification makes the right more valuable, not less.273 
The third objection is easily addressed from a technical standpoint: what 
we could not previously do, we can do today.274  A more pointed criticism 
focuses on costs associated with employing quantification methods and 
technologies.  Cost is an important constraint—indeed, it is arguably the key 
constraint—and it is critical to be sensitive to how cost affects groundwater 
users and groundwater managers.  That said, a consideration of costs should 
encompass all factors, including the opportunity costs of uncertain supply 
and unpredictable rights; costs associated with depleted groundwater, poor 
water quality, subsidence, and other adverse effects of uncertain and 
unregulated pumping; the cost of substitute supplies, and re-integration of 
externalities imposed on others.  In many basins, groundwater levels have 
declined to the point that the cost of doing nothing has become unacceptably 
high; in those basins, quantification of pumping rights and data-driven 
management is imperative.275 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although the framework and rules for groundwater rights in California 
and Texas are quite different, the systems share a commonality: In each, 
private ownership interests are necessarily shaped and defined by the nature 
of groundwater as a depletable common pool resource.  Given this reality, 
the concept of unlimited rights is both physically and legally impossible.276  
Unlimited rights are also undesirable because unlimited rights create 
uncertainty and ambiguity that ultimately, and ironically, impair the value of 
the land-based right to groundwater. 
Property owners who hold rights to groundwater should embrace 
quantification as a means of protecting their rights.  Accepting quantification, 
however, does not mean accepting less than one’s fair share of water 
associated with a property right.  The question of how much future water is 
fairly assigned to any particular property owner in light of the capacity of the 
basin and other rights is a separate question, to be addressed in the 
quantification process. 
                                                                                                                 
 276. Griggs, supra note 185, at 1317 (describing how quantification protects the property interest in 
water and noting that “[t]his is not a doctrinal matter”). 
